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Who pays the debtor’s expenses that are incurred during the bankruptcy is a 
common debate. One potential option, especially in small to midsize corporate 
bankruptcies, is a secured creditor who can be surcharged in accordance with 11 
USC § 506(c). Of that section’s three requirements, most litigation concerns the re-
quirement that the expense “benefit” the secured creditor. A split has recently de-
veloped between courts, led by the Seventh Circuit in Trim-X, that require the 
bankruptcy trustee to exclusively intend to benefit the secured creditor and obtain 
secured-creditor consent and courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Domistyle, that 
merely require that the secured creditor receive a benefit. This Comment suggests a 
new approach that permits surcharges when there is a connection between the ex-
pense incurred and the secured creditor’s collateral. This collateral-expense-
connection approach is the best reading of the text of § 506(c) and the pre-Code case 
law that the statute codifies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is no such thing as a free bankruptcy. Someone must 
foot the bill for all expenses incurred while a company goes 
through bankruptcy proceedings, from keeping the lights on to 
paying the attorneys. Who picks up that check persistently gen-
erates litigation. Parties going through bankruptcy often seek to 
force a secured creditor—one who has a right to property cur-
rently possessed by the debtor as collateral securing the credi-
tor’s debt—to compensate for these costs. This arrangement, 
known as surcharging, is expressly permitted under § 506(c) of 
the Bankruptcy Code1 (the “Code”). But the specific criteria for a 
secured-creditor surcharge are subject to debate among the fed-
eral courts. 
Recently, a circuit split developed over whether a surcharge 
is allowed when the bankruptcy trustee—the person appointed 
by the court to manage a debtor—incurs an expense intended to 
benefit not only the secured creditor, but other creditors as well.2 
The difference in the two sides’ rationales highlights two dif-
ferent frameworks under which courts analyze all secured-
creditor surcharge claims. The older view, called the forward-
looking approach, focuses on secured-creditor consent to be 
surcharged. The forward-looking approach developed as a re-
sult of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in In re Trim-X, Inc.3 In con-
trast, the more recent approach developed by the Fifth Circuit in 
 
 1 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-598, 92 Stat 2549, codified at 11 
USC § 101 et seq. 
 2 Compare In re Trim-X, Inc, 695 F2d 296, 301 (7th Cir 1982), with In re 
Domistyle, Inc, 811 F3d 691, 699 (5th Cir 2015). 
 3 695 F2d 296 (7th Cir 1982). 
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In re Domistyle, Inc4 (the backward-looking approach)5 trains its 
attention on the connection between the collateral—property in 
which the secured creditor has a claim—and the expense. Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit, money spent directly on the collat-
eral can be surcharged, while general expenses, such as attor-
ney’s fees, cannot.6 
The facts of Domistyle illustrate the salience of the split. 
Domistyle, a manufacturer and purveyor of home goods, owed 
Southwest Securities $3.69 million.7 In exchange, the bank per-
fected a security interest in Domistyle’s candle factory, which 
gave it a registered legal right to foreclose on the factory, 
thereby protecting itself from a complete loss of repayment in 
case of default.8 In addition, Domistyle owed money to several 
creditors that held no security interests. Domistyle could not pay 
these debts, so it filed for bankruptcy and made a plan to sell all 
its assets.9 The court appointed Milo Segner to be the bank-
ruptcy trustee.10 Because Southwest Securities held a security 
interest in the factory, it stood to receive either the full value of 
the factory or $3.69 million, whichever was less.11 If the factory 
could be sold for more than $3.69 million, then the unsecured 
creditors would split whatever extra value remained.12 
Shortly before Domistyle filed for bankruptcy, the factory 
was appraised at about $6 million, so Segner understandably 
believed it could be sold for much more than $3.69 million.13 
Segner paid for security, repairs, utilities, and insurance premi-
ums related to the factory.14 Southwest Securities never agreed 
to these expenses, but it did not try to stop them, either.15 At a 
cost of about $400,000, those expenses allowed Segner to keep 
the factory in approximately the same condition for the next 
 
 4 811 F3d 691 (5th Cir 2015), cert denied, Southwest Securities, FSB v Segner, 137 
S Ct 2186 (2017). 
 5 The Fifth Circuit used “forward-looking” and “backward-looking” to differentiate 
an inquiry into an expected benefit (measured from the time the expense was incurred) 
from an after-the-fact determination whether the efforts realized a benefit. See Domistyle, 
811 F3d at 696. 
 6 See id at 698–99. 
 7 Id at 693. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 694. 
 10 See id at 693. 
 11 See 11 USC § 506(a). 
 12 See 11 USC § 506(a). 
 13 Domistyle, 811 F3d at 693–94. 
 14 Id at 694. 
 15 See id at 694–95. 
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year.16 Yet he was unable to find an acceptable purchaser.17 But 
suppose a wealthy neighbor eventually bought the property for 
just $3.4 million.18 Because there was no excess value for unse-
cured creditors, which might have been used to cover the upkeep 
costs, can Segner surcharge Southwest Securities the $400,000 
he incurred? The Fifth Circuit’s backward-looking approach al-
lowed a surcharge because Segner spent the money directly on 
the property that Southwest Securities’ security interest covered 
and Southwest Securities eventually received a benefit. But the 
Seventh Circuit’s forward-looking approach would have blocked 
a surcharge because Southwest Securities did not consent to the 
expense. 
This difference is important and has implications beyond 
the courtroom. A surcharge is conceivable in every bankruptcy 
because the trustee invariably spends some funds on secured 
property, typically on expenses like appraisal fees or electricity 
bills. In the largest bankruptcies, secured creditors are so con-
cerned about potential surcharges that they often negotiate with 
the debtor to exchange cash for a waiver of the surcharges before 
the bankruptcy begins. In such cases, the secured creditors and 
the debtor ask the bankruptcy judge to approve their agreement 
on the very day the bankruptcy is filed.19 Until the agreement is 
final, the debtor will not file. Under these agreements, the se-
cured creditors provide the debtor with the cash essential to con-
tinued operation during the bankruptcy. The debtor, in ex-
change, waives any potential § 506(c) surcharge that may later 
arise. Such agreements are considered a “practical necessity” if 
the debtor is going to stay in business during the bankruptcy.20 
The terms of these debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing agree-
ments in large bankruptcies are determined, in part, by the 
 
 16 See Brief of Appellant, In re Domistyle, Civil Action No 14-41463, *5 (5th Cir 
filed Mar 31, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 1607877) (“Segner Brief ” ). 
 17 Domistyle, 811 F3d at 694. 
 18 In the actual case, the property was abandoned to Southwest Securities, and 
Segner sought a $400,000 payment directly from Southwest Securities. See id at 694–95; 
Segner Brief at *5 (cited in note 16). 
 19 See, for example, Interim Cash Collateral Order, In re Motors Liquidation Co, 
Bankruptcy Action No 09-50026, *9 (Bankr SDNY June 1, 2009) (available on Westlaw 
at 2009 WL 5135513) (“General Motors”); Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order, on an 
Interim and Final Basis, In re Blockbuster Inc, Bankruptcy Action No 10-14997, *1–2, 11 
(Bankr SDNY Sept 23, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 3723740) (“Blockbuster”). 
The same law firm represented both General Motors and Blockbuster. See Debtor Repre-
sentations *7, 9 (Weil, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/KA89-YYNM. 
 20 See In re Cooper Commons LLC, 512 F3d 533, 536 (9th Cir 2008). 
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viability of a potential surcharge under the particular approach 
selected by the court. Uncertainty in either the state of the law 
or its application can torpedo these essential negotiations. 
This Comment offers a solution that resolves the split in the 
law and provides a clear test on which courts and interested 
parties can rely. Part I reviews the aspects of bankruptcy law 
necessary to understand why secured-creditor surcharges exist. 
Part II examines both the split over whether a trustee must in-
tend to exclusively benefit the secured creditor at the time the 
expense is maintained and the rationale underlying each of the 
main opinions. In Part III, the Comment offers a solution to the 
circuit split that roots itself in the connection between the ex-
pense incurred and the secured creditor’s collateral. The solution 
first assumes that the expense is reasonable and necessary, and 
that the secured creditor did not consent. The court should then 
look to whether it is a general expense—one that affects the 
whole estate—or spent directly on collateral. If it is a general 
expense, no surcharge is allowed. If it is an expense spent on col-
lateral, a surcharge is allowed in an amount based on the per-
centage of the total recovery that the creditor receives. Then, 
Part III argues that this approach is the best reading of 
§ 506(c)’s text and the law in effect before the Code’s enactment. 
I.  BANKRUPTCY BACKGROUND 
The availability of a secured-creditor surcharge depends on 
the details of the bankruptcy proceedings. Part I.A explores the 
role that creditors—both secured and unsecured—and the trus-
tee play in a bankruptcy. Part I.B details the protections avail-
able to secured creditors that are unavailable to unsecured cred-
itors. Part I.C then describes the expenses typically generated in 
a bankruptcy and who pays them. 
A. The Parties in a Bankruptcy Proceeding 
Different types of bankruptcy cases are filed under differ-
ent chapters of the Code, depending on the type of entity filing 
and the goal of the bankruptcy.21 A business organization can 
file under either Chapter 11, when it hopes to continue opera-
tions,22 or Chapter 7, when it liquidates and sells all its assets.23 
 
 21 See 11 USC § 109. 
 22 See 11 USC §§ 1121–29. 
 23 See 11 USC §§ 721–28. 
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Occasionally, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy resembles Chapter 7, 
leading to a plan—called a liquidating trust—under which all 
the assets are sold.24 A secured-creditor surcharge can be at-
tempted during either a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
so long as it meets the requirements of § 506(c).25 
The debtor often continues to control its own operations dur-
ing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. When it does so, it is called a 
debtor in possession.26 But the court must instead appoint a 
trustee if it finds that the debtor mismanaged the bankruptcy or 
if the appointment of a trustee is otherwise in the best interest 
of the estate.27 A trustee is always appointed in Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcies.28 A trustee is an outsider appointed to protect creditors 
but holds substantially the same rights and responsibilities as 
the debtor in possession, including the right to surcharge se-
cured creditors.29 Whoever controls the debtor, whether the 
debtor in possession or a trustee,30 owes a fiduciary duty of loy-
alty to put the interests of both secured and unsecured creditors 
ahead of her own interests.31 Yet, despite the fiduciary duty, a 
trustee’s desire to receive her fee32 creates the incentive, not 
faced by the debtor in possession, to attempt a surcharge.33 The 
debtor in possession profits by operating the debtor after the 
bankruptcy, but the trustee is paid only during the bankruptcy. 
Because the trustee can be paid only during the bankruptcy, she 
might use the debtor’s resources to seek an unlikely surcharge 
that would pay her fees. The debtor in possession, by contrast, 
would recognize that the surcharge is unlikely to be successful 
and instead dedicate those resources to turning a profit after the 
debtor emerges from bankruptcy. 
 
 24 See Alan Resnick and Harry Sommer, eds, 6 Collier on Bankruptcy § 21.15[3] at 
21-195 to -196 (LexisNexis 16th ed 2017). 
 25 Section 506(c) is within Chapter 5 of the Code and applies to the rest of the Code. 
See 11 USC § 103(a). For the § 506(c) requirements, see Part I.C. 
 26 See 11 USC §§ 1101, 1107. 
 27 11 USC § 1104(a). 
 28 See 11 USC §§ 701–04. 
 29 See 11 USC § 1107(a). 
 30 For ease, I will typically refer only to a trustee, though in Chapter 11 a debtor in 
possession is usually in control instead; as noted above, its legal rights and responsibili-
ties are essentially identical. See 11 USC § 1107(a). 
 31 See In re Rigden, 795 F2d 727, 730–31 (9th Cir 1986); US Department of Justice, 
Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees *4-2 (Oct 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/24Y4-LTFB. 
 32 The trustee is entitled to compensation for her services under 11 USC § 330, sub-
ject to the maximums—which vary depending on the amount of assets in the estate—
imposed by § 326. 
 33 See text accompanying notes 233–41. 
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There are two kinds of creditors—secured and unsecured. 
The secured creditor’s claim is secured by a specific piece of 
property.34 In order to gain priority in bankruptcy for a secured 
claim, the creditor must perfect its interest.35 The rules for per-
fecting secured interests are governed by state law, typically fol-
lowing Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.36 The property 
is encumbered by the secured creditor’s right to the property, 
commonly called a lien.37 Outside of bankruptcy, if the loan goes 
unpaid, the secured creditor can foreclose on and take the collat-
eral property.38 For example, a home mortgage lender is a se-
cured creditor because it provides a homeowner with cash 
through a mortgage and, if the homeowner does not pay, the 
lender can foreclose on and resell the house, thereby limiting 
its loss. 
The secured asset cannot be used to distribute value to 
other creditors until the secured creditor is paid in full.39 If the 
secured creditor cannot be paid in full because the value of its 
claim is larger than the value of the collateral, then the secured 
creditor receives an unsecured claim—also called a deficiency 
claim—for the remaining amount.40 In this situation, the se-
cured creditor is considered “undersecured.”41 For example, sup-
pose a secured creditor is owed $100,000 and has a perfected 
security interest in a warehouse. When the warehouse is sold for 
$60,000, the secured creditor receives the $60,000 as well as an 
unsecured deficiency claim for the remaining $40,000.42 
Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, hold claims over all 
the assets of the estate, not just one particular asset. An un-
secured claim cannot be paid until the secured creditors are paid 
the full value of the collateral that their claim encumbers and 
 
 34 See UCC §§ 1-201(b)(35), 9-102(a)(73). 
 35 See UCC §§ 9-203, 9-308. 
 36 For Article 9’s security-perfection rules, see UCC §§ 9-308 to -316. For the pur-
poses of this Comment, all secured creditors are assumed to have properly perfected 
interests. 
 37 See 11 USC § 101(37). 
 38 See, for example, Dewsnup v Timm, 502 US 410, 412–13 (1992) (describing an 
imminent foreclosure stayed by a bankruptcy filing). 
 39 See 11 USC § 506(a). 
 40 See 11 USC § 506(a). 
 41 See United Savings Association of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 
Ltd, 484 US 365, 368 (1988). 
 42 This assumes that the undersecured creditors did not elect to make their loans 
nonrecourse under § 1111(b). The reasons why they would make such an election go be-
yond the scope of this Comment. 
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until the administrative expenses of bankruptcy are paid in 
full.43 Instead of payment in full, unsecured creditors receive a 
pro rata payment, meaning that each receives the same per-
centage of its total claim.44 
B. Tools of Protection for Secured Creditors 
At the moment a debtor files for bankruptcy, an automatic 
stay of nearly all actions against the debtor takes effect, includ-
ing any foreclosure actions that secured creditors might file.45 
During the bankruptcy, the trustee or debtor in possession can 
continue to use the property of the estate,46 including, in some 
cases, property that it merely possesses but does not own.47 The 
trustee may decline to use property in which the estate has no 
ownership stake and abandon the property to the creditor whose 
lien covers that property.48 The secured creditors can protect 
themselves by bringing a motion for relief from the automatic 
stay.49 Before the Code’s enactment (the “pre-Code” era), secured 
creditors could foreclose on a property during bankruptcy50—at 
least until a 1973 rule change introduced the comprehensive 
automatic stay.51 
In addition to a motion for relief from the stay, the secured 
creditor can also ask the court for “adequate protection” under 
§ 363(e).52 Though never defined, the Code gives three examples 
 
 43 See 11 USC §§ 725, 726(a)(1). For a discussion of administrative expenses, see 
Part I.C. 
 44 11 USC § 726(b). Pro rata distribution works as follows: Assume that a bank-
ruptcy involved ten creditors, each owed $400. A reorganization plan is approved, leav-
ing $800 to pay all the unsecured creditors. Because each unsecured creditor’s claim is 
10 percent of the total unsecured claims, each will receive 10 percent of the remainder. 
Thus, each one would receive the same amount—$80 out of its $400 claim—typically re-
ferred to as twenty cents on the dollar. 
 45 See 11 USC § 362(a). Section 362(b) provides exceptions, none of which is rele-
vant to this Comment. 
 46 See 11 USC § 363. 
 47 See 11 USC § 541(d). See also, for example, In re Plastech Engineered Products, 
Inc, 382 Bankr 90, 105–06 (Bankr ED Mich 2008). 
 48 See 11 USC § 554. 
 49 See 11 USC § 362(d). For an example of a motion to lift the automatic stay and 
the arguments that parties might make for and against such a motion, see Plastech, 382 
Bankr at 90. 
 50 See James O. Johnston Jr, Note, The Inequitable Machinations of Section 362(a)(3): 
Rethinking Bankruptcy’s Automatic Stay over Intangible Property Rights, 66 S Cal L Rev 
659, 666 (1992) (tracing the history of the automatic stay). 
 51 See FRBP 601(a), prescribed by 411 US 989, 1062 (1973), and superseded by 461 
US 975 (1983). 
 52 See 11 USC § 363(e). 
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of adequate protection: (1) a stream of payments, 
(2) replacement liens, or (3) the “indubitable equivalent”53—that 
is, some other source of exactly identical protection. One exam-
ple of a party seeking adequate protection would be a secured 
creditor that leased tools to the debtor. Seeking protection, the 
creditor might ask the court for adequate protection in the form 
of a bank account with funds set aside to cover any depreciation 
in the value of the tools during the bankruptcy.54 
C. Costs in Bankruptcy and Who Pays Them 
Though only the financially troubled enter bankruptcy, they 
still must pay certain expenses during the proceeding. There are 
two main types of expenses: (1) general expenses, such as fees 
for bankruptcy lawyers and the trustee, as well as company-
wide overhead, and (2) expenses spent directly on property of 
the estate, such as appraisal fees, the costs of sale, security 
guards, maintenance costs, and electricity bills. A trustee incurs 
both types of costs pursuant to her fiduciary duty because they 
benefit the creditors. The trustee’s expenditure decision should 
not be affected by which creditors benefit from the expenses. 
However, the identity of the beneficiary is relevant for determin-
ing whether a secured creditor can be surcharged. Both types of 
expenses are considered “administrative expenses” that must be 
paid before a plan to reorganize debts can be confirmed in 
Chapter 11 or before any money can be paid to unsecured credi-
tors in a Chapter 7 liquidation.55 Often, no cash is available to 
pay these expenses because the debtor spent most of its cash 
trying to avoid bankruptcy.56 
When no cash is available, a debtor typically has just one 
conceivable source of cash to pay administrative expenses—the 
secured creditors, who may be surcharged when § 506(c)’s re-
quirements are met, unless they reach a DIP financing agree-
ment that waives such surcharges. Section 506(c) allows the 
trustee to recover a surcharge “from property securing an al-
lowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expen-
ses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of 
 
 53 See 11 USC § 361. 
 54 See Alan Resnick and Harry Sommer, eds, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 361.03 at 
361-10 to -11 (LexisNexis 16th ed 2017). See also 11 USC § 548. 
 55 See 11 USC §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2). 
 56 See Patricia Lindauer, Professional Fees and Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code: A Plea for Secured Creditors, 98 Dickinson L Rev 401, 407 (1994). 
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any benefit to the holder of such claim, including the payment of 
all ad valorem property taxes with respect to the property.”57 
Bankruptcy expenses that cannot be surcharged are paid accord-
ing to § 507(a)(2) after secured creditors are paid in full.58 
The surcharge of secured creditors has generated a large 
volume of case law.59 The Supreme Court dealt with such sur-
charges in Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co v Union 
Planters Bank,60 but its focus was on who can request a sur-
charge, not when those claims are permissible.61 However, 
Hartford Underwriters instructs courts to adhere closely to 
the text of the Code in determining whether a surcharge is 
permissible.62 
Section 506(c) has three requirements for a surcharge: the 
expense to be surcharged must be (1) reasonable and 
(2) necessary, and (3) must benefit the secured creditor.63 That 
an expense is “reasonable” and “necessary” is often uncontested. 
For example, the secured creditor in In re Delta Towers, Ltd64 
conceded, without dispute, that utility charges were both rea-
sonable and necessary.65 The interpretation of “benefit,” on the 
other hand, has engendered more controversy. 
II.  COURTS SPLIT OVER “BENEFIT” 
The courts are divided over when an expense “benefits” a 
secured creditor as required to justify a surcharge. When the col-
lateral sells for more than the secured creditor is owed, a sur-
charge paid out of the surplus is rarely questioned. But some-
times such a recovery is impossible—even the secured creditor 
cannot be paid off in full because the property is sold for less 
than its claim. Cases like these have led to a circuit split over 
what circumstances justify a surcharge to the secured creditor. 
Part II.A examines the forward-looking approach, which 
denies a surcharge when the trustee intends to benefit other 
 
 57 11 USC § 506(c). 
 58 See 11 USC § 507(a)(2). 
 59 See In re Wyckoff, 52 Bankr 164, 165 (Bankr WD Mich 1985) (“The volume of 
caselaw on the question of expenses chargeable to a secured party is huge.”). 
 60 530 US 1 (2000). 
 61 See id at 5–6. 
 62 See id at 6. 
 63 See Trim-X, 695 F2d at 299; Domistyle, 811 F3d at 695. 
 64 924 F2d 74 (5th Cir 1991). 
 65 Id at 77. See also Brookfield Production Credit Association v Borron, 738 F2d 
951, 952 (8th Cir 1984). 
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creditors in addition to the secured creditor on the theory that 
such intent, without consent, decisively determines that there 
was no benefit. Part II.B explores a recent case adopting the 
backward-looking approach, which ignores the trustee’s intent 
at the time the expense was incurred and asks only whether the 
creditor eventually received a benefit. 
A. The Forward-Looking Approach 
Beginning with Trim-X, some courts have held that a trus-
tee can surcharge only if she intended to exclusively benefit the 
secured creditors at the time she incurred the expense. These 
courts reason that secured-creditor consent is required: the only 
way to determine that a secured creditor benefits is when it sub-
jectively demonstrates its benefit through consent. When the 
trustee attempts to benefit other creditors, these courts refuse to 
find a benefit because a secured creditor would not consent to 
these expenses. This approach was later termed the forward-
looking approach by the Fifth Circuit. This Section first looks at 
Trim-X itself and then examines the cases that followed in its 
steps. 
1. Trim-X first required secured-creditor consent. 
In Trim-X, the Seventh Circuit formulated the forward-
looking approach to the “benefit” prong that was later adopted 
by other courts. That approach held both that the trustee must 
intend to benefit only the secured creditor and that the secured 
creditor’s consent was required. In the case, Commercial Credit 
Business Loan (CCBL) held a perfected security interest that 
encumbered certain assets possessed by the debtor, Trim-X.66 
The trustee employed a security company to protect the assets 
and also spent money to have them appraised, hoping to sell the 
property to recover value for unsecured creditors, at least until 
appraisals determined the property was worth less than 
CCBL’s secured interest.67 The trustee eventually abandoned 
the property and attempted to use § 506(c) to obtain a court 
order requiring CCBL to reimburse him for expenses incurred in 
preserving the assets up to that point.68 The bankruptcy court 
awarded the trustee a surcharge—$1,000 for use and occupancy 
 
 66 See Trim-X, 695 F2d at 297. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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fees, $500 for security, and $350 in utilities69—and the district 
court affirmed.70 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, ques-
tioned whether the expenses benefited CCBL, and determined that 
any expenses incurred before abandonment were not recoverable.71 
The Trim-X court reasoned that there could be no recovery 
for expenses incurred with the intent to benefit unsecured credi-
tors in addition to the secured creditor. Even though the court 
noted that the creditor eventually benefited from the expenses, 
the court still found that the expenses failed the “benefit” test 
because CCBL did not cause or consent to the expenses. Accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, under pre-Code case law, consent or 
causation by the secured creditor was “relevant” to the availabil-
ity of surcharges, and neither had been proved.72 The court pro-
vided no other factors to consider besides consent and causation, 
implying that only expenses the secured creditor agreed to pay 
could benefit it.73 Thus, the court seemed to believe that to 
demonstrate benefit it must be shown that the secured creditor 
subjectively believed that it benefited from the expense, as 
demonstrated by consent. 
This consent, however, can be implied. Implied consent, 
what the Seventh Circuit called “causation,” can be shown 
through the secured creditor’s affirmative acts or, as in Trim-X 
itself, through the secured creditor’s inaction.74 The court also 
connected secured-creditor consent with the trustee’s intent. So 
long as the trustee intended to benefit other creditors and was 
not exclusively focused on benefiting the secured creditor, CCBL 
would not be deemed to have consented. However, the court 
found that the secured creditor did consent (albeit impliedly) to 
the expenses incurred after abandonment; thus, any expenses 
incurred by the trustee after that date benefited the secured 
creditor and could be surcharged.75 In the end, the court vacated 
and remanded to allow the bankruptcy court an opportunity to 
explain whether the amount it had allowed the trustee to sur-
charge was “reasonable” within the meaning of § 506(c).76 
 
 69 Id at 297–98. 
 70 Trim-X, 695 F2d at 297–98. 
 71 See id at 301–02. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id at 301. 
 74 Trim-X, 695 F2d at 301. See also In re Flagstaff, 762 F2d 10, 12 (2d Cir 1985) 
(characterizing Trim-X as a case of “[i]mplied consent”). 
 75 See Trim-X, 695 F2d at 301. 
 76 See id at 302. 
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By not considering any other way to prove the secured credi-
tor’s benefit, the Seventh Circuit seemed to indicate that con-
sent, implied or actual, was the only possible way to prove this 
factor and surcharge the secured creditor.77 Trim-X’s reference 
to “consent” and “causation” describes two sides of the same 
coin;78 a secured creditor either actively sought an expense and 
thus caused it to be incurred, or the creditor agreed to the ex-
pense, thus consenting to a surcharge.79 Unless a creditor ac-
tively seeks an expense, it does not cause the expense.80 Similarly, 
unless the creditor agrees to an expense—either expressly or 
through clear implication—it has not consented.81 Trim-X used 
the terms interchangeably; the difference between them seems 
to be whether the trustee or the creditor actively sought the 
expense.82 
2. The progeny of Trim-X. 
Other courts have followed in Trim-X’s forward-looking 
footsteps. Those courts have also held that expenses spent with 
the intention of benefiting anyone other than the secured credi-
tor cannot be surcharged.83 Each of these courts cited Trim-X, 
and, as in Trim-X, these courts concluded that the secured credi-
tor received no benefit unless the creditor’s consent demonstra-
ted that it believed the expense would benefit it. 
For example, the debtor in In re Estate Design & Forms, 
Inc84 possessed, when it filed for bankruptcy, a printing press 
 
 77 See id at 301. 
 78 See id. 
 79 Trim-X, 695 F2d at 301 (finding that the creditor’s motion to appoint a trustee 
constituted both consent and causation), citing In re Hotel Associates, Inc, 6 Bankr 108, 
111–12 (ED Pa 1980). 
 80 See In re Hotel Associates, Inc, 6 Bankr at 110. 
 81 The Trim-X court surcharged CCBL after it failed to act on a motion to abandon. 
Trim-X, 695 F2d at 301. Given that the expenses were undertaken only after a motion to 
abandon—making clear that the expenses would be incurred on property that CCBL 
would momentarily regain—the court seems to view this as a clear implication that CCBL 
consented to the expenses. Id. See also In re Chicago Lutheran Hospital Association, 89 
Bankr 719, 730 (Bankr ND Ill 1988). 
 82 Although Trim-X refers to both consent and causation, the latter is better under-
stood as implied consent; thus, this Comment will typically refer only to consent. 
 83 In addition to the case discussed below, see, for example, In re Proto-Specialties, 
Inc, 43 Bankr 81, 84 (Bankr D Ariz 1984); C.I.T. Corp v A & A Printing, Inc, 70 Bankr 
878, 880–81 (MD NC 1987); In re Wyckoff, 52 Bankr 164, 167–68 (Bankr WD Mich 1985). 
Proto-Specialties helpfully gave a description of what exclusive intent to benefit a se-
cured creditor looks like. See Proto-Specialties, 43 Bankr at 83–84. 
 84 200 Bankr 138 (ED Mich 1996). 
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that it had purchased from a company named Heidelberg.85 Be-
cause the debtor had not made any payments on it before filing 
for bankruptcy, Heidelberg asked the trustee to agree to lift the 
automatic stay and allow it to repossess the press.86 The trustee 
agreed, but not before appraising the press, suggesting that he 
hoped it could be sold at a price that would benefit unsecured 
creditors, in addition to Heidelberg.87 He then filed a motion to 
surcharge Heidelberg for the cost of storing the press, as well as 
other expenses.88 The bankruptcy court permitted the surcharge, 
but the district court did not, citing Trim-X to support its deter-
mination that the secured creditor gained no benefit until the 
trustee abandoned the property because Heidelberg never con-
sented to pay the rent or any other expense.89 Until the press 
was abandoned to Heidelberg, the trustee was attempting to re-
cover for the unsecured creditors; the secured creditor received 
collateral worth the same value had the property been surren-
dered earlier and benefited only to the extent it avoided a few 
expenses, such as the rent and heating costs of a space for the 
press.90 
Cases that adopt the forward-looking approach focus on 
secured-creditor consent. Even when the trustee did not intend 
to benefit the secured creditor exclusively, if the secured creditor 
consents to the expenses, a surcharge may still be possible. This 
conclusion follows from Trim-X. Unless the creditor consented, 
thereby demonstrating a subjective belief that it would benefit 
from the expense, these courts would not find a benefit. This 
was true even if it seemed quite likely that the creditor did in-
deed benefit. Typically, these cases use “consent” to stand for 
“consent or causation,” as used in Trim-X.91 The creditor’s con-
sent indicates that it believes the expense works to its benefit; 
otherwise, it would not consent.92 
While these cases all recognize that consent is not mentioned 
in the text of § 506(c), many seem to treat it as a requirement. 
 
 85 Id at 140. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 Estate Design, 200 Bankr at 140. 
 89 See id at 142. 
 90 Id at 142–43. 
 91 See Trim-X, 695 F2d at 301. See also Hotel Associates, 6 Bankr at 111–12. 
 92 See In re Swann, 149 Bankr 137, 143 (Bankr SD 1993) (“The Court may treat a 
creditor’s consent as advance acknowledgement that certain of the costs and expenses 
incurred would benefit such holder.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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For instance, In re Wiltwyck School93 cited many previous cases 
for the proposition that consent was an important factor rele-
vant to the benefit inquiry.94 In that case, in which the debtor 
sought costs for “preserving, maintaining and disposing of” a 
school building,95 the court found no consent because the creditor 
arranged for a sale and the debtor rejected it.96 It concluded that 
without consent, any benefit was too remote and uncertain to 
allow a surcharge.97 Also, in Trim-X itself, the Seventh Circuit 
indicated that consent was the only way to demonstrate a bene-
fit.98 Meanwhile, other courts indicate that secured-creditor con-
sent is an alternative, extratextual approach to determine 
whether a creditor received a benefit.99 According to these 
courts, the three requirements of § 506(c) present an “objective 
test,” while creditor consent is a “subjective test” that can sepa-
rately justify a surcharge.100 
After Trim-X, consent is usually relevant, even in general-
expense cases. Courts may discuss consent in these cases in part 
because of Trim-X’s imprecise reading of the pre-Code case 
law.101 Note two important facts about general-expense cases. 
First, courts do not always carefully distinguish between general 
expenses of the debtor and those spent directly on a piece of 
property in the estate.102 This is a mistake—the distinction mat-
ters. While it may be easy to demonstrate that an expense bene-
fits a secured creditor when it is spent directly on a particular 
piece of property—because the creditor may have had to pay 
that expense otherwise—it may be nearly impossible to deter-
mine whether a general expense benefits a secured creditor. In 
such situations, the creditor’s consent is a subjective means to 
show that a general expense benefits the creditor. 
Additionally, in general-expense cases, the focus is on im-
plied consent. While these courts look for consent, they do not 
 
 93 34 Bankr 270 (Bankr SDNY 1983). 
 94 See id at 273–75. 
 95 See id at 272. 
 96 See id at 274–75. 
 97 See Wiltwyck School, 34 Bankr at 275. 
 98 See text accompanying notes 90–92. 
 99 See In re Mall at One Associates, LP, 185 Bankr 981, 987–88 (Bankr ED Pa 
1995), citing In re Nutri/System, Inc, 169 Bankr 854, 872 (Bankr ED Pa 1994). 
 100 See Mall at One, 185 Bankr at 987–88. See also In re Orfa Corp of Philadelphia, 
170 Bankr 257, 271–73 (ED Pa 1994). 
 101 See Part III.B.2. 
 102 See, for example, In re Cascade Hydraulics and Utility Service, Inc, 815 F2d 546, 
548–49 (9th Cir 1987). 
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require a formal contract between the trustee and the secured 
creditor to find consent.103 However, they do note that consent 
should be implied with caution.104 Mere cooperation with a 
debtor, or acquiescence to an attempted reorganization, is an in-
sufficient basis on which to find consent. For example, In re 
Flagstaff Foodservice Corporation105 (“Flagstaff I”) considered a 
debtor that wanted to surcharge the secured creditor for attor-
ney’s fees, arguing that the creditor consented because it used 
Chapter 11 to sell its collateral.106 The Second Circuit denied the 
surcharge.107 Providing expertise to help the debtor create a viable 
plan to reorganize its debts did not imply that the secured credi-
tor consented to be surcharged; it was not sufficiently clear that 
the creditor believed it benefited from the expense.108 However, 
other courts have found implied consent to surcharge general 
expenses because the secured creditor clearly indicated in some 
way that it benefited from the expenses.109 For instance, In re 
Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc110 found that a secured creditor 
consented by implication to pay the fees of the trustee because it 
insisted on the appointment, knowing the debtor could not pay 
him, rather than protecting its property in another way.111 
B. The Backward-Looking Approach 
Trim-X’s approach is not the only one. A recent Fifth Circuit 
case, Domistyle, termed its approach “backward-looking.” Reject-
ing the exclusive-intent rule from Trim-X and its consent re-
quirement, the court instead looked at the connection between 
the expense and the collateral. This Section first examines 
 
 103 See Trim-X, 695 F2d at 301 (finding consent for expenses after the petition to 
abandon despite the absence of a formal contract). 
 104 See, for example, In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp, 762 F2d 10, 12 (2d Cir 1985) 
(“Flagstaff II”). 
 105 739 F2d 73 (2d Cir 1984). 
 106 See id at 77. 
 107 See id, quoting In re S & S Industries, Inc, 30 Bankr 395, 398 (Bankr ED 
Mich 1983). 
 108 See Flagstaff II, 762 F2d at 12. 
 109 See, for example, Hotel Associates, 6 Bankr at 110–11. 
 110 50 Bankr 598 (Bankr ED Va 1985). 
 111 See id at 610. Note that Bob Grissett used a flawed standard first developed in 
First Western Savings and Loan Association v Anderson, 252 F2d 544 (9th Cir 1958), a 
case also cited in Trim-X. This standard attempts to weigh the equities by determining 
whether a surcharged secured creditor or an unpaid trustee would be harmed more. See 
Bob Grissett, 50 Bankr at 604. Patricia Lindauer has noted many problems with this 
vague approach. See Lindauer, 98 Dickinson L Rev at 407–10 (cited in note 56). 
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Domistyle and then discusses other cases that rely on a connec-
tion between the expenses and the collateral, even though they 
do not explicitly reject Trim-X. 
1. Domistyle takes a different approach. 
In Domistyle, the Fifth Circuit explicitly disagreed with the 
forward-looking approach of Trim-X and Estate Design, and in-
stead employed what it termed the backward-looking ap-
proach.112 As described in the Introduction,113 the key asset in 
the case was a candle factory on which Southwest Securities 
held a lien for $3.69 million. Domistyle filed for bankruptcy in 
April 2013 and confirmed a liquidating trust, meaning that all 
the property would be sold.114 The trustee reasonably believed 
the factory could be sold for more than Southwest Securities was 
owed.115 The trustee attempted to sell the candle factory from 
August 2013 to May 2014, but never found a buyer willing to 
pay a price that would pay the secured claim in full and also 
allow the unsecured creditors to recover some value.116 During 
this time, he incurred various expenses to preserve the factory’s 
value.117 Eventually, the trustee filed a motion to abandon the 
factory, and Southwest Securities agreed to surcharges for fu-
ture expenses.118 The trustee then filed a motion to also sur-
charge the expenses incurred before the motion to abandon.119 
The bankruptcy court approved the surcharge, and the Fifth 
Circuit took a direct appeal.120 
Claiming fidelity to the text of the Code, the Fifth Circuit 
permitted the surcharge.121 The court rejected the exclusive-
intent rule promoted by Trim-X and Estate Design because the 
Code, according to the court’s plain-meaning interpretation, does 
not require intent to benefit the secured creditor.122 Instead, the 
question for the court was whether the secured creditor did, in 
 
 112 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 699. 
 113 See text accompanying notes 5–18. 
 114 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 694. For information on liquidating trusts, see note 24. 
 115 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 693–94. 
 116 Id at 694. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id at 694–95. 
 119 Domistyle, 811 F3d at 695. 
 120 See id. 
 121 See id at 696–700. 
 122 Id at 696–97. 
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fact, benefit.123 If it did benefit, it was inequitable to charge the 
estate expenses that benefited only the secured creditor.124 Be-
cause the court found that “Southwest [Securities] obtained 
some benefit,” as demonstrated by the testimony of a real estate 
broker, the surcharge was permitted.125 But, according to the 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion, there was no inequity when the expenses 
were general, such as the trustee’s fee, and benefited the entire 
estate. Thus, those expenses could properly be charged to the 
debtor and its unsecured creditors, but not the secured creditor, 
even if the secured creditor eventually received some benefit.126 
According to the Fifth Circuit, courts should stress the 
“collateral-expense connection” to avoid this potential inequity.127 
For instance, money spent to advertise the sale of the property, 
to pay for its utilities, or to protect it are all spent directly on the 
collateral, and have a collateral-expense connection.128 On the 
other hand, the trustee’s fee will not be connected to the collat-
eral because the trustee manages all the debtor’s assets.129 There 
is no connection between her fee and any particular piece of col-
lateral. According to the court, if there was no collateral-expense 
connection, there could be no surcharge; likewise, if there was a 
connection, a surcharge was possible.130 The court found consent 
irrelevant because it is not mentioned in the text of the Code.131 
2. Other circuits use the collateral-expense connection to 
deny surcharges for a lack of “benefit” to the secured 
creditors. 
Other circuits recognize the importance of a collateral-
expense connection as well, often in the context of assessing 
whether general expenses, such as attorney’s fees, benefit the 
secured creditor. The Third Circuit refused to surcharge a se-
cured creditor the amount of previously unpaid taxes in In re 
C.S. Associates132 because the incidental benefits that the secured 
creditor received from the collateral’s location in a particular city 
 
 123 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 696. 
 124 See id. 
 125 Id at 700–01. 
 126 See id at 697. 
 127 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 697–98. 
 128 See id at 694. 
 129 See, for example, In re Towne, 536 Fed Appx 265, 269 (3d Cir 2013). 
 130 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 698. 
 131 See id at 699–700 & n 10. 
 132 29 F3d 903 (3d Cir 1994). 
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were not sufficiently related to the collateral.133 Given the lack of 
connection, the taxes did not benefit the creditor that held a lien 
on that collateral.134 The court did not even mention consent. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in In re Cascade Hydraulics and 
Utility Service, Inc135 held that telephone utilities, taxes, and at-
torney’s fees were incurred for the benefit of the whole estate 
and not the secured creditor’s collateral.136 Because those ex-
penses did not provide a direct benefit to the secured creditor 
protected by the collateral, they were not recoverable.137 Vague 
assertions of benefit were insufficient; instead, the debtor was 
required to show that the benefit was directly tied to a piece of 
secured-creditor collateral.138 In Cascade Hydraulics, the court 
also found that there was no consent.139 
A divided Eighth Circuit panel applied this principle in 
Brookfield Production Credit Association v Borron.140 The debt-
ors operated a turkey farm.141 After it was clear that they would 
not be able to reorganize their debt, the bankruptcy court lifted 
the automatic stay, allowing secured creditors to collect their 
collateral—crops, animals, machinery, and cash.142 When the 
debtors attempted to surcharge the secured creditors for unspec-
ified expenses, the bankruptcy court refused because they could 
not show the secured creditors’ benefit as they “failed to ascribe 
actual expenses to specific items of collateral.”143 The district 
court and the Eighth Circuit majority affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s decision, the latter with little discussion.144 Though the 
majority did not permit a surcharge, Judge Myron Bright would 
have reversed and remanded to allow the debtor in possession to 
demonstrate that the “expenses went to specific items of collat-
eral.”145 He believed that the debtors might clearly identify how 
 
 133 See id at 906–07. 
 134 See id. 
 135 815 F2d 546 (9th Cir 1987). 
 136 See id at 547–48. 
 137 See id at 548. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See Cascade Hydraulics, 815 F2d at 548–49. 
 140 738 F2d 951 (8th Cir 1984). 
 141 Id at 951. 
 142 Id at 952. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Borron, 738 F2d at 952–53. 
 145 Id at 954–55 (Bright dissenting). Bright, in fact, would have gone even further. 
He would have required the trustee to “demonstrate the extent to which the value of the 
collateral increased as a direct result of those expenditures.” Id at 955 (Bright dissenting). 
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their expenses were connected to the collateral.146 Regardless of 
the outcome, both the majority and the dissent focused on the 
lack of collateral-expense connection in the factual record. Nei-
ther opinion even mentioned consent. 
III.  THE TEXT AND PRE-CODE PRACTICE SUPPORT A 
COLLATERAL-EXPENSE-CONNECTION APPROACH 
Courts should look exclusively to the connection between 
the secured creditor’s collateral and the debtor’s expense when 
determining if a secured creditor has benefited and can be sur-
charged. As noted above, courts employ either of two approaches 
to determine whether there was a benefit. The forward-looking 
approach turns on whether the trustee intended to exclusively 
benefit the secured creditor at the moment she incurred the ex-
penses. This can lead to unjust enrichment if the secured credi-
tor eventually gets a benefit, but avoids a surcharge due to lack of 
consent. It forces courts to focus on consent, which incentivizes 
trustees to bring more § 506(c) motions because they believe 
they can demonstrate implied consent more easily than an actu-
al benefit to the secured creditor.147 Trustees would often claim 
that the secured creditor could have acted to stop the expenses 
but failed to do so, thus demonstrating implied consent, even 
when they cannot demonstrate that expense benefited the credi-
tor. In contrast, the backward-looking approach asks whether 
there is a connection between the expense and the collateral 
and, if so, whether the creditor actually benefited, ignoring the 
trustee’s intent when she spent the funds. But it limits the 
power a secured creditor can wield over property the creditor 
will eventually possess, power exercised through giving or with-
holding consent. 
This Part provides a solution to the split. Instead of adopt-
ing either the backward-looking or forward-looking approach, 
courts should look exclusively to the connection between the col-
lateral and the expense to determine whether the secured credi-
tor benefits, ignoring trustee or debtor intent altogether. Unlike 
courts employing the forward-looking approach, this approach 
treats secured-creditor consent as an exception to the rule, ra-
ther than a requirement for surcharge. Though this solution re-
sembles the backward-looking approach, it differs slightly in 
 
 146 See id (Bright dissenting). 
 147 See text accompanying notes 233–42. 
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that it assumes that reasonable and necessary expenses con-
nected to collateral benefit the secured creditor. This approach 
not only simplifies the court’s task, it also provides a clear back-
ground rule that simplifies the high-stakes waiver-for-financing 
agreements that often must be negotiated before a large bank-
ruptcy begins. Part III.A examines the text of § 506(c), conclud-
ing that it envisions a collateral-expense-connection approach. 
Part III.B argues that the pre-Code case law employs a collateral-
expense-connection approach to surcharges and then confronts 
Trim-X’s contention that the pre-Code case law requires secured-
creditor consent. Part III.C uses the collateral-expense connection 
to develop a comprehensive rule for secured-creditor surcharges. 
Finally, Part III.D confronts some possible shortcomings of the 
textual rule developed here. 
A. Courts Must Focus on the Text, Which Favors a Collateral-
Expense-Connection Approach 
The section of the Code governing secured-creditor sur-
charges is § 506(c), which states that: 
The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed 
secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses 
of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of 
any benefit to the holder of such claim, including the pay-
ment of all ad valorem property taxes with respect to the 
property.148 
The provision is typically seen as imposing three requirements: 
the expense to be surcharged must be (1) reasonable and 
(2) necessary, and (3) must benefit the secured creditor.149 This 
solution, which interprets the third requirement, remains faith-
ful to the text of § 506(c). The Supreme Court has often said that 
lower courts must adhere closely to the text of the Code in their 
decisions, including in cases specifically dealing with § 506.150 If 
the text of § 506(c) is clear, courts should follow it.151 And 
 
 148 11 USC § 506(c). 
 149 See Trim-X, 695 F2d at 299; Domistyle, 811 F3d at 695. 
 150 See, for example, Hartford Underwriters, 530 US at 6 (“In answering this ques-
tion, we begin with the understanding that Congress ‘says in a statute what it means 
and means in a statute what it says there.’”), quoting Connecticut National Bank v 
Germain, 503 US 249, 254 (1992); United States v Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc, 489 US 235, 
241 (1989) (“[T]he sole function of the courts is to enforce [the Code] according to its 
terms.”), quoting Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470, 485 (1917). 
 151 See Lamie v United States Trustee, 540 US 526, 534 (2004). 
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§ 506(c) is clear—it points to a collateral-expense connection. 
Courts should adopt this straightforward reading of the text 
because it provides a simple background rule critical in pre-
bankruptcy finance negotiations. 
1. The text supports a collateral-expense-connection 
approach. 
The text of § 506(c) points courts to a collateral-expense 
connection for at least five different reasons. First, the language 
of “preserving, or disposing of” indicates a collateral-expense 
connection. Second, the one example of a permitted expense fits 
this approach. Third, a failure to adopt this approach would lead 
to absurd outcomes and leave judges with an impossible task. 
Fourth, unless the benefit is tied to the relationship between an 
expense and the collateral, no expense would fail the “benefit” 
requirement that does not already fail the “necessary” require-
ment. Finally, to avoid the absurd results, all the circuits to con-
sider the issue require the surcharged creditor to be the “primary 
beneficiary,” an extratextual requirement that is best seen as an 
attempt to reach the same results as a collateral-expense-
connection approach. 
First, the surcharge is permissible for expenses spent “pre-
serving, or disposing of, such property.” An expense that is not 
incurred for a specific piece of property can hardly be for the 
preservation or disposal of that property. For example, one could 
not say that attorney’s fees for managing the entire estate went 
toward preserving or disposing of a single piece of property. The 
fee would have been incurred even if that specific piece of prop-
erty did not exist in the estate. Instead, the attorneys attempt to 
maximize the value of the entire estate. Perhaps, in a vague 
sense, because the trustee works to preserve the value of the 
whole estate, some modicum of her fee preserves the value of the 
individual property. But if that were decisive, then every rea-
sonable and necessary expense could be surcharged because 
every reasonable and necessary expense is undertaken to pre-
serve the total value of the estate. Such a result is not envi-
sioned by the Code.152 In contrast, funds spent directly on the 
property, such as funds for a guard to prevent vandalism, do 
preserve the property. Similarly, funds spent to dispose of the 
 
 152 See text accompanying note 155. 
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property, such as the cost to advertise an auction, are connected 
to the collateral. 
Second, § 506(c) gives an example of a surchargeable ex-
pense: “the payment of all ad valorem property taxes.” The 
drafting history of the Code makes clear that this is an example 
and not an exception.153 An ad valorem property tax is the basic 
property tax that a municipality charges for each particular plot 
of land.154 Because the tax is tied to a particular piece of collat-
eral—a single piece of land—there is a clear collateral-expense 
connection. Though not decisive on its own, the fact that the only 
example given in the statute has a clear collateral-expense con-
nection points toward adopting this rule. 
Third, not adopting a collateral-expense requirement would 
lead to absurd outcomes, requiring Herculean judging to over-
come. The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to avoid 
absurd outcomes when interpreting the text of the Code.155 The 
text cannot mean that any expense is recoverable, so long as it 
benefits the secured creditor even a small amount. If that were 
so, secured creditors could be surcharged a tiny fraction of every 
expense incurred during bankruptcy because they plausibly 
benefit some small amount from each. For instance, a trustee 
could argue that, because her fee benefited the entire estate, it 
benefited the secured creditor at least a little bit. But there is no 
method for determining what percentage of that widely spread 
benefit went to the secured creditor. A simple calculation, such 
as charging the secured creditor a percentage of the fee based on 
the percentage of the total recovery it receives, does not actually 
take into account the benefit the creditor received. Some secured 
creditors may recover the same value no matter what actions 
the trustee takes while others see their recoveries rise dramati-
cally; charging all based on a simple formula ignores this. If 
courts actually attempted to determine the benefit each creditor 
received, they would struggle to determine the various magnitudes 
 
 153 This language was added to § 506(c) in 2005 when Congress revised 
§ 503(b)(1)(B)(i) to make clear that ad valorem taxes were an administrative expense the 
debtor was required to pay. So Congress both made clear that these taxes must be paid 
and made clear that they could be surcharged. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 § 712, Pub L 109-8, 119 Stat 23, 128, codified in various 
sections of Title 11. 
 154 Black’s Law Dictionary 1685 (Thomson Reuters 10th ed 2014). 
 155 See Hartford Underwriters, 530 US at 6. See also United Savings Association of 
Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd, 484 US 365, 375 (1988) (rejecting an 
interpretation of the Code that the Court deemed to be absurd). 
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of these numerous surcharges. This is more than just a difficult 
factual determination. Congress likely did not want to grind the 
bankruptcy process to a halt for the nickel-and-dime surcharges 
of every general expense. 
Fourth, allowing any marginally beneficial expense to be 
surcharged, regardless of its connection to the collateral, would 
be flawed for another reason. Every expense that failed the 
“benefit” test would have already failed the “necessary” test.156 
This is because only those expenses that harm the creditor 
would fail the “benefit” test, unless the expenses are so distant 
from the collateral that they do not affect the creditor’s recovery 
by even a penny—an unlikely result. It would never be neces-
sary to incur an expense that harms the secured creditor be-
cause the trustee has a fiduciary duty to the creditor to act in 
its best interest.157 Without a creditor-expense connection, the 
“benefit” requirement would be rendered superfluous.158 
Finally, to avoid these absurd results, many circuits (possi-
bly aware of the normatively desirable outcome) add an extra-
textual requirement:159 every court to consider § 506(c) has come 
to a common understanding that the secured creditor should be 
the primary beneficiary of the expense.160 This requirement 
helps them consistently reach the same result as the creditor-
expense-connection approach,161 which demonstrates that the 
collateral-expense-connection approach is on the right track. In 
nearly every instance, if there is a connection between the se-
cured creditor’s collateral and the expense, then the secured 
 
 156 Perhaps an expense could be characterized as necessary because the trustee be-
lieved it to be necessary when she incurred it but was honestly mistaken. However, 
courts seem to evaluate whether an expense was actually necessary only in hindsight. 
See, for example, Bob Grissett, 50 Bankr at 607–08 (evaluating the reasonableness of a 
rent expense without reference to whether it appeared necessary when it was incurred). 
 157 See In re Troy Dodson Construction Co, 993 F2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir 1993) (“The 
trustee owes a fiduciary duty to all the creditors, not just to the unsecured creditors.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 158 See Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v 203 North 
LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 US 434, 452 (1999) (noting that courts should “give 
meaning to all the statutory language”), citing United States v Menasche, 348 US 528, 
538–39 (1955), and Moskal v United States, 498 US 103, 109–10 (1990). 
 159 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 696 (“Where does [the] ‘primarily for the benefit of ’  
language come from? Not the Bankruptcy Code.”), quoting Delta Towers, 924 F2d at 77. 
 160 See, for example, Delta Towers, 924 F2d at 77; In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp, 
762 F2d 10, 12 (2d Cir 1985) (“Flagstaff II”). 
 161 See In re Senior-G & A Operating Co, 957 F2d 1290, 1300 (5th Cir 1992) (employ-
ing a “primarily for the benefit of the creditor” test in a manner that is consistent with a 
collateral-expense connection). 
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creditor will be the primary beneficiary. For instance, the funds 
spent on guards in Domistyle were connected to Southwest 
Securities’ collateral and Southwest Securities was the primary 
beneficiary. It is hard to imagine an expense that would not be 
connected to the secured creditor’s collateral that nonetheless 
primarily benefited that creditor.162 
2. The focus on trustee intent and creditor consent is not 
consistent with the text. 
The reasoning of courts that consider exclusive intent or re-
quire consent when deciding whether an expense meets the 
“benefit” requirement is inconsistent with the text of § 506(c). If 
Congress wanted a surcharge to depend on consent or exclusive 
intent to benefit the secured creditor, it could have used those 
words in § 506(c).163 The word “benefit” does not include a hint of 
either notion. Instead, a creditor benefits when the value of col-
lateral is preserved or increased,164 which can occur with or 
without the creditor’s consent and regardless of the intent of the 
trustee. Because § 506(c) does not mention trustee intent or 
creditor consent, courts should shift their focus to the collateral-
expense connection. 
The location of “benefit” in the statute also makes this clear. 
Section 506(c) allows the trustee to recover the “reasonable, nec-
essary costs . . . to the extent of any benefit.” By placing “bene-
fit” in a phrase describing the amount of recovery, Congress in-
dicates that the benefit is something that occurred, not 
something that was sought. The amount of the benefit is not 
measured by the benefit the trustee expected the secured credi-
tor to receive; if it was, Congress would have made this clear by 
including a word like “expected” or “sought.” Instead, the actual 
benefit after the fact is envisioned. Through the location of 
 
 162 There might be a situation in which the secured creditor is not the primary bene-
ficiary, despite a collateral-expense connection, but in practice this would make little dif-
ference. That would occur if the collateral was worth much more than the amount owed 
to the secured creditor. In that situation, the primary beneficiary would be the un-
secured creditors, so no surcharge would be available under the approach these courts 
use. Under a collateral-expense-connection approach, the secured creditor could be sur-
charged for the amount it benefited, but the benefit would typically be $0 because the 
creditor would receive a full recovery whether the expense was incurred or not. 
 163 See Czyzewski v Jevic Holding Corp, 137 S Ct 973, 984 (2017) (holding that 
Congress’s failure to mention a practice in the Code means that Congress did not intend 
to allow it). 
 164 See Borron, 738 F2d at 954–55 (Bright dissenting). 
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“benefit” in § 506(c), Congress connects “benefit” less to the mo-
tives of the trustee than to other, possibly more obvious, drafting 
possibilities. In contrast, if Congress had worded this part of the 
statute as “secured creditors may be surcharged for reasonable, 
necessary, and beneficial expenses,” then it would be ambiguous 
whether the trustee’s intent should be considered. This hypo-
thetical construction does not clearly refer to either the trustee’s 
subjective belief that the expense was beneficial or the expense’s 
actual beneficial results. But the actual text of § 506(c) clearly 
refers to the latter, focusing itself entirely on whether there was 
an actual benefit. 
In addition, § 506(c)’s other two requirements do not rely on 
trustee intent or creditor consent. Whether an expense was 
“reasonable” and “necessary” is an objective test that a court can 
evaluate after the fact.165 It is reasonable to expect that “benefit” 
would also be an objective test that can be evaluated after the 
expense is incurred. Instead of forcing courts to evaluate the 
“reasonable” and “necessary” prongs before switching gears and 
inquiring into the trustee’s state of mind or a possible implied con-
tract between the secured creditor and the trustee, the collateral-
expense-connection approach keeps the court’s task equally sim-
ple for all three factors. 
Furthermore, reading into § 506(c) a requirement that the 
trustee exclusively intends to benefit the secured creditor or that 
the secured creditor’s consent is necessary could allow unjust 
enrichment. A secured creditor could observe an expense being 
incurred and wait—not exercising its tools of protection despite 
the knowledge that the expense may benefit it—in the hopes of 
paying no costs because the trustee could not prove consent. 
Consider the facts of Domistyle. Under an approach that required 
exclusive intent in order to surcharge, Southwest Securities 
would have been content to let the trustee keep paying expenses, 
knowing that he could never surcharge them. If Southwest 
Securities had used the tools that the Code gives it,166 it could 
have regained the asset. But, if exclusive intent is essential, 
Southwest Securities would not use those tools when it could 
leave the trustee looking elsewhere to cover the tab. The desire 
 
 165 See Mall at One, 185 Bankr at 987 (noting that the reasonable and necessary 
tests are objective criteria in a surcharge test). 
 166 See note 49. 
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to avoid unjust enrichment led the Fifth Circuit (rightly) to re-
ject Trim-X ’s forward-looking approach to surcharges.167 
Perhaps it seems that noting the role of the collateral-
expense connection in § 506(c) removes consent from the benefit 
inquiry entirely. Not so. This recognition dispels only the notion 
that consent is a hard-and-fast requirement. Consent still may 
be relevant for two reasons. First, if the creditor and trustee 
agree that the trustee will undertake expenses and the creditor 
will reimburse those expenses, such an agreement forms an en-
forceable contract. Second, if the creditor consented to be sur-
charged, such consent demonstrates that the creditor expects 
some benefit to be gained from the expense for its collateral. 
Thus, consent may still be one method of proving “benefit.” But 
the text makes clear that it is not the only way. 
Frustrated secured creditors might accuse this reading of 
missing a key temporal aspect of what it means to benefit a se-
cured creditor. Like the creditor in Domistyle, such creditors 
may argue that they cannot benefit unless the collateral is 
abandoned as soon as possible.168 They would contend that if the 
trustee holds onto the property any longer than it takes to 
abandon the collateral, the secured creditor cannot benefit from 
the delay. However, “benefit” in § 506(c) does not include a tem-
poral connotation. In a similar context, the Supreme Court held 
that secured creditors could receive “adequate protection” to 
prevent lost value but excluded the time value of money from 
the adequate-protection guarantee.169 Thus, secured creditors ac-
tually lost value—a dollar today is more valuable than a dollar 
tomorrow. The instant abandonment that the creditor in 
Domistyle sought would have been more valuable than their re-
covery from a later abandonment. The Supreme Court has made 
clear that courts should not read a temporal element into the 
Code if it is not present in the text. Moreover, the secured credi-
tors have the option to bring a motion to abandon under 
§ 554(b). Such a motion would allow the secured creditor to re-
deem its property if it is of “inconsequential value and benefit to 
the estate.”170 Courts stay true to the Code when they encourage 
 
 167 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 696. 
 168 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Southwest Securities, FSB v Segner, Docket 
No 15-1223, *10–11 (US filed Mar 28, 2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 1298193). 
 169 See Timbers, 484 US at 369–76. 
 170 11 USC § 554(b). 
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motions to abandon collateral rather than reading into § 506(c) a 
requirement that the trustee must sell or abandon the property. 
Congress may have intended secured-creditor surcharges to 
be a narrow exception to bankruptcy funding, but the collateral-
expense-connection approach does not improperly expand the 
exception. It is true that the unsecured creditors generally cover 
the expenses of bankruptcy, and courts have sometimes seen 
§ 506(c) as a narrow exception to that general rule of bankruptcy 
funding.171 The “exclusive intent” or “creditor consent” alterna-
tives might further restrict the number of surcharges compared 
to a collateral-expense-connection approach. But this Comment’s 
solution retains § 506(c)’s status as a narrow exception—
perhaps even narrower than its competitors—because many 
possible expenses have no connection to the collateral. For ex-
ample, if a secured creditor that was aware of the attorney’s fees 
did not object as they were incurred, a court using a backward-
looking approach could find implied consent, which would allow 
the surcharge. But a court adopting a collateral-expense-
connection approach would not seriously entertain the sur-
charge. Regardless, courts should adopt the best reading of the 
text, not just the reading that creates the narrowest exception. 
B. The Pre-Code Case Law Supports a Collateral-Expense-
Connection Approach 
Pre-Code cases follow a collateral-expense-connection ap-
proach, though without naming it as such. A vast swath of cases 
relies on the connection between the expense and the collateral 
that the trustee is attempting to surcharge to prove secured-
creditor benefit.172 Legislative history from both the House and 
the Senate noted that § 506 “codifies current law” regarding 
secured-creditor surcharges, amplifying the importance of pre-
Code case law.173 This Section demonstrates that the typical pre-
Code case used a collateral-expense connection, which exposes 
Trim-X ’s reliance on pre-Code cases as unsupported, even by the 
cases it cites. 
 
 171 See Borron, 738 F2d at 953 (Bright dissenting). 
 172 See Part II.B.2. 
 173 See In re Korupp Associates, Inc, 30 Bankr 659, 661–62 (Bankr D Me 1983), quot-
ing HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5963, 
6313, and S Rep No 95-989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 
5787, 5854. 
2018] A Simplified “Benefit” Prong 1067 
 
1. Numerous pre-Code cases follow a collateral-expense-
connection approach. 
Courts followed the collateral-expense-connection approach 
by permitting money spent directly on encumbered property to 
be recovered. Courts often assumed that these expenses bene-
fited secured creditors without much discussion, typically noting 
briefly that the amount of a surcharge was the cost of preserva-
tion and sale of a piece of property.174 For example, the property 
in In re Myers175 was sold for more than the mortgage amount, so 
the expenses spent on the property not only benefited the se-
cured creditor, but also the unsecured creditors.176 Yet Judge 
Learned Hand still permitted a surcharge of the “expenses of 
sale and of so much else as actually helped to preserve the prop-
erty or its proceeds.”177 In another case, Gugel v New Orleans 
National Bank,178 the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
lienholder could be charged with the “reasonable costs of [bank-
ruptcy proceedings] as are appropriate to foreclosing the lien 
and selling the [e]ncumbered property.”179 However, this did not 
include general expenses.180 Likewise, in Miners Savings Bank of 
Pittston, Pa v Joyce,181 the Third Circuit reasoned that a secured 
creditor’s delay in moving for foreclosure should not force it to 
cover the general expenses of the bankruptcy because such a 
surcharge would penalize the secured creditor for allowing the 
property to possibly benefit unsecured creditors.182 But the court 
continued, “This of course is not to say that the lienholder 
should not bear the reasonable expenses of preserving the prop-
erty, which expenses were clearly for its benefit.”183 Though “for 
 
 174 In addition to the cases cited below, see, for example, In re Chapman Coal Co, 
196 F2d 779, 785 (7th Cir 1952) (permitting a surcharge to pay coal workers when 
nonemployment would have led to a flooded mine); Title & Trust Co v Wernich, 68 F2d 
811, 814 (9th Cir 1934) (allowing a surcharge to compensate watchmen who were guard-
ing the property); Virginia Securities Corp v Patrick Orchards, 20 F2d 78, 81–82 (4th Cir 
1927) (permitting a surcharge to maintain an orchard but not for “general administra-
tion of the estate”). 
 175 24 F2d 349 (2d Cir 1928). 
 176 See id at 349. 
 177 Id at 351. The Second Circuit reaffirmed this holding in In re Rapid Motor Lines, 
Inc, 325 F2d 436, 436 (2d Cir 1964). 
 178 239 F 676 (5th Cir 1917). 
 179 Id at 679. 
 180 See id at 677–78. 
 181 97 F2d 973 (3d Cir 1938). 
 182 Id at 977. 
 183 Id. 
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its benefit” could indicate that the trustee spent the funds in an 
attempt to benefit a secured creditor, the context shows that the 
court was merely recognizing the actual beneficiary, not the in-
tended beneficiary. If the court did rely on the trustee’s intent, it 
failed to mention that logic in the opinion; the trustee is not 
even mentioned in the relevant paragraph. 
Although these pre-Code cases relied on a collateral-expense 
connection to decide whether the secured creditor benefited, 
consent could still be important. But creditor consent was never 
a requirement, despite the Trim-X court’s belief. Before 1973, 
secured creditors could foreclose on collateral in state court; 
since the advent of the automatic stay, secured creditors no 
longer have that option.184 The ability to foreclose in state court 
made consent more relevant in the pre-Code era, compared to 
now. Secured-creditor inaction meant the creditor turned down 
an opportunity to retrieve the property—an opportunity that se-
cured creditors do not enjoy today. But courts did not rely on 
this inaction, and the implied consent it could indicate, in evalu-
ating the viability of a surcharge. Despite the ability to foreclose, 
consent was not a requirement. The only cases that turned on 
consent were general-expense cases, in which the trustee sought 
attorney’s fees or taxes that the estate paid. The norm in general-
expense cases was to prohibit surcharges without the consent of 
the secured creditor because such a general expense did not 
benefit the creditor.185 However, if the expense was to preserve 
the value of a specific piece of property or to sell it—and thus not 
a general expense at all—it benefited the secured creditor and 
could be surcharged regardless of consent. So consent was not a 
requirement even in an era when consent was more relevant. 
Overall, these pre-Code cases demonstrate that the “benefit” 
inquiry must center on the connection between the expense and 
the collateral. No case turned on the intent of the trustee. While 
secured-creditor consent was important in some cases, it was 
simply an alternative way to demonstrate the benefit of general 
expenses—that is, expenses that could not otherwise be sur-
charged due to a lack of collateral-expense connection. By con-
senting to expenses or actively causing them, the secured credi-
tor indicates that those general expenses accrue to its benefit. In 
 
 184 See notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 185 See In re Torchia, 188 F 207, 208–09 (3d Cir 1911); Miners Savings, 97 F2d at 
977; In re Pioneer Sample Book Co, 374 F2d 953, 960–61 (3d Cir 1967). See also In re 
New York & Philadelphia Package Co, 225 F 219, 223–24 (D NJ 1915) (collecting cases). 
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sum, the actual pre-Code practice reflects a collateral-expense-
connection approach, even though the courts did not use that 
precise terminology. 
2. Despite Trim-X ’s claims, pre-Code case law does not 
support the forward-looking approach. 
Though the text of the Code is consistent with a collateral-
expense-connection approach, Trim-X argued that the pre-Code 
case law supports requiring consent to prove a “benefit.”186 This 
Section dissects the pre-Code case law that Trim-X cites; upon 
close examination, it does not support a focus on consent. Ra-
ther, these pre-Code cases do just the opposite—they reveal that 
the key to secured-creditor surcharges is the connection between 
collateral and expense. 
Trim-X cited six cases to support its forward-looking ap-
proach and reliance on secured-creditor consent: Textile Banking 
Co v Widener,187 First Western Savings and Loan Association v 
Anderson,188 Robinson v Dickey,189 Equitable Loan & Security Co 
v R.L. Moss & Co,190 In re Tyne,191 and In re Atlantic Boat 
Builders Co.192 But none truly supports Trim-X when held up to 
scrutiny. Instead, they prove that consent is a possible alterna-
tive method to prove “benefit” but do not hold that consent is 
necessary. Nor do any of these cases indicate that the trustee’s 
intent can affect the “benefit” prong of a surcharge claim. Ra-
ther, they look to the connection between the expense and the 
collateral. 
The various holdings of these cases demonstrate how their 
conclusions differ from the conclusion that Trim-X drew. In 
Textile Banking, the Fourth Circuit reversed a $1,600 noncon-
sensual payment, not because nonconsensual surcharges are per 
se unacceptable, but because the court took issue with the man-
ner of calculating the $1,600.193 The Ninth Circuit in First 
Western used an approach to surcharging expenses that weighed 
the equity of a surcharge.194 This flawed approach,195 not even 
 
 186 See Trim-X, 695 F2d at 301. 
 187 265 F2d 446 (4th Cir 1959). 
 188 252 F2d 544 (9th Cir 1958). 
 189 36 F2d 147 (3d Cir 1929). 
 190 125 F 609 (5th Cir 1903). 
 191 257 F2d 310 (7th Cir 1958). 
 192 1979 Bankr LEXIS 887 (Bankr MD Fla). 
 193 See Textile Banking, 265 F2d at 453–54. 
 194 See First Western, 252 F2d at 548 n 8. 
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adopted by Trim-X, asked whether the secured creditor had con-
sented.196 But the surcharge was still prohibited because the 
trustee’s and attorney’s fees were general expenses—in other 
words, not for the “preservation, protection, and benefit of [the 
secured creditor’s] property.”197 So, when the court weighed the 
equities (under the flawed approach), it still considered whether 
there was a collateral-expense connection as part of its balanc-
ing. Equitable Loan ordered a secured creditor to pay for ex-
penses it had previously consented to pay.198 The Fifth Circuit 
authorized other expenses surcharged, without any instruction 
that a search for consent was required, indicating that consent 
was merely an alternative way to prove that the secured creditor 
benefited.199 In Tyne, the Seventh Circuit held that the consent 
of a first creditor could be passed to a second creditor, because 
the second creditor voluntarily assumed the interests of the 
first, who had consented; whether the first person’s consent was 
required to surcharge went unconsidered.200 Finally, in Atlantic 
Boat, a nonconsenting secured creditor was surcharged the cost 
of rent for a property because the creditor held a lien on inven-
tory stored within it.201 The bankruptcy court for the Middle 
District of Florida thus relied on a connection—albeit a tenuous 
one—between the rent expense and the benefit to the secured 
creditor’s inventory collateral. 
On first glance, Robinson seems to support Trim-X ’s hold-
ing, but context dispels the notion. In that case, secured credi-
tors sought to foreclose on a property in state court.202 Though 
there was clearly no consent—the creditors wanted nothing but 
foreclosure—the Third Circuit allowed a surcharge for the “ex-
penses incurred to save their property.”203 The court began by 
noting that unsecured creditors should typically pay for the 
bankruptcy expenses because the trustee is “acting in their be-
half and spending money for their benefit.”204 The court noted 
 
 195 See note 112 and accompanying text. 
 196 See First Western, 252 F2d at 548 n 8. The court, in fact, considered consent as 
one of six factors in a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry into the equity of the sur-
charge. Id. 
 197 Id at 548 n 9. 
 198 See Equitable Loan, 125 F at 610. 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Tyne, 257 F2d at 310–11. 
 201 See Atlantic Boat, 1979 LEXIS 887 at *12–13. 
 202 Robinson, 36 F2d at 148. 
 203 See id at 149. 
 204 Id. 
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one exception: when the secured creditor “expressly or impliedly 
consent[s].”205 Read in isolation, this paragraph may support 
Trim-X’s idea that consent is a requirement. But in the next 
paragraph, the court held that this case fell into another excep-
tion—an exception within the no-surcharges-without-consent 
rule—because “[the secured creditors] would have been com-
pelled to expend the money here in question in their own inter-
est had the foreclosure not been stayed.”206 In other words, the 
secured creditors still could be charged the expenses because 
they were the beneficiaries. Though the court’s use of a “general 
rule of law”207 with multiple exceptions is confusing, the rule 
Robinson advocates is the collateral-expense-connection ap-
proach. Because the expense was something the creditor would 
have incurred itself had it foreclosed, there was a connection, 
and a surcharge was permissible. 
In all, these cases do more to undermine Trim-X than sup-
port it. None saw consent as a requirement; instead, most saw it 
as an alternative way to collect expenses that could not other-
wise be surcharged. Consent was merely an alternative way to 
show that the secured creditor benefited; if there was no benefit, 
there would be no consent. Trim-X went awry with two key 
errors. First, it misunderstood the possibility of using consent as 
an alternative method of showing “benefit” and instead exalted 
it as a requirement. Second, it ignored the key difference be-
tween general-expense cases like First Western and cases with a 
collateral-expense connection. Under the collateral-expense-
connection approach, the only possible proof of “benefit” from a 
general expense is the secured creditor’s consent. Trim-X im-
ported that rule from general-expense cases to all cases. Perhaps 
these flaws are explained, in part, by Trim-X’s rush to exam-
ine pre-Code cases without first carefully examining the text 
of the Code. 
C. The Collateral-Expense-Connection Approach Suggests a 
Comprehensive Surcharge Solution 
The text of the Code and the pre-Code case law support a 
collateral-expense-connection approach to the surcharge ques-
tion. If an expense is connected to the collateral, then the 
 
 205 Id. 
 206 Robinson, 36 F2d at 149. 
 207 Id. 
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creditor benefited and the creditor can be surcharged; the trus-
tee’s intent at the time of the expense is irrelevant.208 This clear 
rule would facilitate prebankruptcy negotiations that often swap 
§ 506(c) waivers in exchange for bankruptcy financing. With a 
settled rule, the debtor and creditors would know which of the 
bankruptcy’s expenses would be subject to potential surcharg-
ing. This knowledge clearly establishes the stakes of the financ-
ing negotiations. 
In short, the key to the solution is the connection between 
the expense and the collateral. The first step is ensuring that 
the expenses are reasonable and necessary (§ 506(c)’s other re-
quirements). Then the court should determine whether there 
was express consent; if so, a surcharge is appropriate. Other-
wise, consent is irrelevant. The court then must distinguish be-
tween general expenses and expenses specific to the secured 
creditor’s collateral. A general expense can never be surcharged 
unless extraordinary circumstances mandate an exception. But 
expenses spent on collateral can always be surcharged. The 
amount of the surcharge depends on the percentage of the total 
recovery the secured creditor received. 
If every court focused on the collateral-expense connection, 
most decisions would eventually reach the same ultimate con-
clusion.209 Courts err when they dwell too much on consent, re-
gardless of whether they find it. This laser focus on consent is a 
result of the influence that Trim-X holds over the “benefit” 
prong in § 506(c) surcharge cases, whether they are general ex-
penses, such as attorney’s fees, or expenses spent directly on col-
lateral.210 Because of Trim-X, many courts today believe a trus-
tee must prove consent to meet § 506(c)’s “benefit” requirement. 
Consequently, these courts feel compelled to explain why there 
was no implied consent in each instance.211 
Yet the fixation with consent sends the wrong message to 
trustees. Many erroneously think they can prove implied con-
sent, even for a general expense (such as the trustee’s own fee), 
likely leading them to bring more surcharge actions. In every 
surcharge action, the trustee can say the creditor could have 
 
 208 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 698. 
 209 See Part II.B. 
 210 Compare Borron, 738 F2d at 953 (Bright dissenting) (referencing Trim-X in a 
case attempting a surcharge for expenses spent directly on collateral), with Cascade 
Hydraulics, 815 F2d at 548–49 (using Trim-X while analyzing a surcharge for general 
expenses). Trim-X has been cited by over 150 cases. 
 211 See, for example, Cascade Hydraulics, 815 F2d at 549. 
2018] A Simplified “Benefit” Prong 1073 
 
done more to stop the expense and that its failure to do so consti-
tutes implied consent. The expectation of more surcharge actions 
adds another level of uncertainty to the critical financing nego-
tiations that often precede large bankruptcies. In addition, the 
courts’ focus on consent might incentivize secured creditors to be 
underinvolved with a reorganization for fear of the perception of 
consent, even though their industry insights could provide valu-
able assistance.212 In short, the focus on consent could be harm-
ful unless it is truly required by the Code. And as it is not, 
courts must instead focus on whether an expense is spent di-
rectly on collateral. 
Noting this key fact—the reliance on the collateral-expense 
connection—presents a comprehensive solution for courts deter-
mining when secured-creditor surcharges should be available. 
Courts should begin with the reasonable and necessary factors 
contained in § 506(c). The reasonable and necessary prongs pre-
vent a trustee from freely spending funds on collateral, hoping 
against hope that the property will eventually yield a return to 
unsecured creditors. In most instances, these two prongs will 
remain as easy to prove as they have always been, and the par-
ties will continue to only rarely contest them.213 The few cases in 
which the expenses are neither reasonable nor necessary will be 
fairly obvious. If the secured creditor argues that the expense 
should not have been incurred, regardless of who pays it, one 
can surmise that the two prongs are not satisfied. In contrast, in 
Domistyle, the secured creditor tried to prevent the trustee from 
ceasing payments for the security staff, a clear indication of the 
reasonableness and necessity of that expense.214 
Next, a court should pursue another simple inquiry: Was 
there express consent? If so, there can be a surcharge.215 This is 
a fair result; forcing the estate to pick up expenses that the se-
cured creditor caused the trustee to incur would create perverse 
incentives for creditors. Besides, consent indicates that the se-
cured creditor considers the expenses to be a benefit. Rather than 
this simple inquiry into express consent, most secured-creditor 
 
 212 The secured creditor in Domistyle even objected to abandonment. Domistyle, 811 
F3d at 694–95. 
 213 See, for example, Delta Towers, 924 F2d at 77. 
 214 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 694. 
 215 See In re Felt Manufacturing Co, 402 Bankr 502, 526–27 (Bankr D NH 2009). 
Note that because the Code does not discuss express consent, state contract law would 
govern. See Butner v United States, 440 US 48, 55–56 (1979) (instructing courts to follow 
state law in areas in which the Code provides no instruction). 
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surcharge cases today focus their discussion on the issue of im-
plied consent.216 The extensive attention that consent receives in 
these cases indicates that if its role and rationale were clearer, 
the trustee would never attempt the surcharge. Instead of hop-
ing to prove implied consent, the trustee would know that the 
alleged surcharge would fail the collateral-expense-connection 
test. This solution would discourage these long-shot surcharge 
actions, reducing judicial decision costs and simplifying pre-
bankruptcy waiver negotiations. 
In the absence of express secured-creditor consent, the court 
should determine whether the expenses are general, affecting all 
the assets of the estate, such as attorney’s fees and the trustee’s 
fees, or whether they are spent directly on collateral. Typically 
this will be easy, but there is the occasional tough call. For in-
stance, if the trustee spent five hours selling a piece of property, 
are her fees for those five hours general or specific to that prop-
erty?217 It’s a tough question, but one with fairly few permuta-
tions, so courts can quickly build precedent around them. If the 
court decides that an expense is a general expense, this rule should 
apply: no general expenses can be considered beneficial (and there-
fore recoverable) except under extraordinary circumstances. 
By definition, the extraordinary exceptions should be few, 
though there are at least two that should apply. First, imagine a 
secured creditor that holds a lien over all the assets, or essen-
tially all the assets, of an estate.218 In that instance, all general 
expenses effectively benefit that secured creditor, so it would be 
equitable to surcharge them.219 Such a lien over all the assets of 
the estate justifies treating the entire estate as the creditor’s col-
lateral. Thus, even a general expense, such as the trustee’s fee, 
is essentially connected to the creditor’s collateral even if it is 
not connected to any one piece of property. In addition, the se-
cured creditor with a lien over all the assets typically holds con-
siderable influence over the debtor and can probably dictate 
 
 216 See, for example, In re Gluth Brothers Construction, Inc, 424 Bankr 379, 399–400 
(Bankr ND Ill 2009). 
 217 See Miners Savings, 97 F2d at 977 (permitting recovery for the trustee’s fees 
while selling property, but not for the general administration of the debtor). 
 218 Professor David Gray Carlson first discussed this potential exception. See David 
Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and Expenses of Bankruptcy Administration, 70 NC L 
Rev 417, 420 (1992). 
 219 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 696–97. 
2018] A Simplified “Benefit” Prong 1075 
 
which expenses are incurred.220 Second, consider the factual sit-
uation from Bob Grissett.221 A secured creditor who advocates for 
a trustee’s appointment or some other expense while it knows, 
or reasonably should know, that the estate could never cover 
those costs can justifiably be charged its fair share.222 In both 
situations, given the secured creditor’s control over the decision 
to incur the expense, it is more equitable to surcharge the se-
cured creditor than to force the debtor to pay.223 
If the court determines that the trustee incurred the ex-
pense directly on encumbered property, then it should allow a 
surcharge anytime the property is worth less than the claim.224 
For example, if a secured creditor’s claim is for $110 and the 
property is sold for $100, a trustee or debtor in possession can 
surcharge the secured creditor for the property taxes. This is 
justified because the increased value of that property directly 
benefits the secured creditor.225 Therefore, courts should ignore 
the intent of the trustee.226 
The more complex question comes when the property is sold 
for more than the value of the secured loan. For example, con-
sider a case in which the secured claim is for $110 and the prop-
erty sells for $120. In such a case, the court can surcharge the 
secured creditor for part of the expense by balancing the value 
the expense preserved for the secured creditor against the 
amount of recovery obtained for other creditors. The best solu-
tion would be to surcharge the secured creditor a percentage of 
the expense, based on the percentage of the asset’s value they 
received. Consider two examples: in one, the secured creditor is 
owed $900 and the property sells for $910; in the other, the se-
cured creditor is owed only $50 (after years of repayment) and 
the asset sells for $1,000. So in the first example, the secured 
 
 220 Secured-creditor control is becoming more common in large Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations. See generally Kenneth M. Ayotte and Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and 
Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J Legal Analysis 511 (2009). 
 221 See Bob Grissett, 50 Bankr at 605–07. 
 222 See id at 609. 
 223 See Senior-G, 957 F2d at 1298. See also In re Codesco Inc, 18 Bankr 225, 230 
(Bankr SDNY 1982). 
 224 See Senior-G, 957 F2d at 1300–01 (determining that the return of 59.5 percent of 
the value to secured creditor was sufficient for the action to be primarily for the benefit 
of that creditor). 
 225 See Domistyle, 811 F3d at 698. 
 226 See id. 
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creditor would pay 98.9 percent of any expense spent on the col-
lateral and in the second example just 5 percent.227 
The following decision tree in Figure 1 illustrates the chain 
of decisions that the court should make. 
FIGURE 1. SURCHARGE DECISION TREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Potential Shortfalls of a Collateral-Expense-Connection 
Approach 
The proposal is essentially textualist: the collateral-
expense-connection approach is the better reading of the text, as 
well as the pre-Code case law that § 506(c) codifies. Support for 
a textualist approach is found in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hartford Underwriters, which held that any question about 
who has standing to bring surcharge claims under § 506(c) must 
begin with the text.228 But textual decisions in bankruptcy have 
flaws.229 Often, they create unintended downsides because appel-
late judges, who rarely see bankruptcy cases in action, do not 
 
 227 For the arithmophobes, divide the amount that the secured creditor received by 
the total recovery from the asset. In the first example, the secured creditor received $900 
and the total recovery was $910. $900 divided by $910 is, after rounding, 98.9 percent. 
 228 Hartford Underwriters, 530 US at 11. 
 229 For a discussion of some of the flaws, see David Gray Carlson, Surcharge and 
Standing: Bankruptcy Code Section 506(c) after Hartford Underwriters, 76 Am Bankr L 
J 43, 44, 57–58, 60–61 (2002). Carlson’s piece examines some unexpected side effects of 
the Court’s textualist decision in Hartford Underwriters. In light of the harmful side 
effects, it is hard not to conclude that the decision in Hartford Underwriters is less effi-
cient than potential alternatives less anchored to the text. 
Is the 
expense 
reasonable 
and 
necessary? 
Yes 
No 
Is there 
express 
consent 
from 
secured 
creditor? 
No 
surcharge 
allowed. 
Yes 
Surcharge 
is allowed. 
No 
Is the 
expense a 
general 
expense? 
Yes 
No 
surcharge 
allowed. 
No 
Determine 
the 
percentage 
of value 
from the 
property 
given to 
secured 
creditor. 
 
Surcharge 
the secured 
creditor 
that 
percentage. 
2018] A Simplified “Benefit” Prong 1077 
 
take into account the dynamism implicit in bankruptcy.230 Un-
like most other areas of law, a bankruptcy decision is not a rul-
ing on events that occurred in the past; it is an ongoing proceed-
ing in a lower court. A strict rule, based on the text, can ruin the 
flexibility that an ongoing reorganization may require.231 In 
other words, the best reading of the text might not always de-
velop the most efficient rule for bankruptcy. In fact, Justice 
Elena Kagan, in a recent colloquy with a bankruptcy attorney, 
questioned whether close adherence to the Code was actually 
the most efficient approach or whether another approach—one 
less bound by the text—might be better.232 Whether or not she 
believes the answer to her question is that the textual solution 
nevertheless is always better, the mere fact that she asked the 
question is noteworthy. 
There are two potential shortfalls to the textualist solution 
suggested by this Comment. First, the solution could lead to 
trustees pursuing fewer avoidance actions, which recover assets 
of the debtor that were improperly distributed before the bank-
ruptcy filing. Second, it could lead to the hasty abandonment of 
valuable property by the trustee or a premature grant of a se-
cured creditor’s lift-stay motion by the bankruptcy court. Both 
consequences could flow from the secondary and tertiary effects 
of the Comment’s surcharge rules. 
The first concern is that a collateral-expense-connection 
approach would lead to fewer avoidance actions, which bring 
assets into the estate for distribution to the creditors. Most 
bankruptcies cannot proceed as reorganizations and must con-
vert to Chapter 7 liquidations.233 Many Chapter 7 liquidations do 
not have unencumbered cash available to cover the general ex-
penses of the bankruptcy, including the trustee’s fees.234 But 
 
 230 See id at 44–45. 
 231 See id. 
 232 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Czyzewski v Jevic Holding Corp, Docket No 15-
649, *43–45 (US Dec 7, 2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 7117910) (probing the 
existence of an “equitable exception for Pareto-superior outcomes”). 
 233 See Michelle M. Arnopol, Why Have Chapter 11 Bankruptcies Failed So Misera-
bly: A Reappraisal of Congressional Attempts to Protect a Corporation’s Net Operating 
Losses after Bankruptcy, 68 Notre Dame L Rev 133, 134 n 6 (1992). But see Elizabeth 
Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the 
Critics, 107 Mich L Rev 603, 612–15 (2009) (arguing that the low success rate is not a 
flaw but instead represents a screening process through which bankruptcies that have 
no chance of reorganization are quickly removed but those that remain have a high suc-
cess rate). 
 234 See Lindauer, 98 Dickinson L Rev at 407 (cited in note 56). 
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every Chapter 7 needs a trustee to manage the liquidation.235 
Trustees may take on bankruptcies that appear to have no un-
encumbered cash due to the possibility of avoidance actions.236 If 
successful, an avoidance action brings funds back to the estate,237 
allowing the trustee to receive her expenses and increasing the 
recovery for general creditors. There are two types of avoidance 
actions. Fraudulent transfers are exchanges that “unfairly or 
improperly deplete a debtor’s assets,”238 and preferences are 
payments made on account of antecedent debt in the ninety days 
before the bankruptcy filing.239 The trustee can bring suit to 
have the court rescind these prepetition transactions, returning 
the value to the estate.240 But such actions are complex and un-
certain.241 The trustee would prefer a simpler way to be paid. 
Section 506(c) waivers can be that simpler method of pay-
ment. As noted above, in large bankruptcies with the largest 
possible surcharges, secured creditors come to the negotiating 
table and agree to provide cash to pay trustees, as well as other 
expenses, in exchange for a waiver of all possible § 506(c) 
claims.242 Secured creditors may be even more eager to engage in 
these settlement agreements if courts adopt the simple collateral-
expense-connection approach advanced by this Comment. Were 
courts to do so, secured creditors could be surcharged for any 
expense spent on their property, regardless of the trustee’s in-
tent. Fearing this surcharge, the secured creditors will seek to 
negotiate a waiver. Meanwhile, the trustee, hoping to get her 
fee, will agree to a deal. Despite the duty of loyalty, the trustee 
may agree to this waiver even if it is not in the best interest of 
the unsecured creditors. Once the trustee has her fee secured, 
she may often not want to risk it by using the cash that the § 506(c) 
waiver generated on uncertain avoidance actions. Instead, she 
 
 235 See 11 USC §§ 701–04. 
 236 See Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 Intl Rev L & 
Econ 223, 226–27 (1991) (noting the practice of trustees bringing avoidance actions in 
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 237 See 11 USC § 550. 
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 240 See 11 USC §§ 547(b), 548(a)(1). 
 241 See United States Department of Treasury v Official Committee of Unsecured 
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would play it safe by not deploying the cash in potentially ex-
pensive litigation, and then collect her fee at the end of the 
bankruptcy. The unsecured creditors would thus lose the chance 
to gain assets through the complex avoidance actions the trustee 
would bring if her fee was not secure. 
The second possible flaw of this proposed solution is that se-
cured creditors may overwhelm the trustee and bankruptcy 
court with attempts to regain their property as soon as possible. 
The secured creditor does not want to be surcharged, so it will 
pressure the trustee to abandon the property, arguing it offers 
no value to a reorganization. If the trustee declines to abandon 
the collateral, the secured creditor will make the same argu-
ments to the bankruptcy court, arguing that the debtor has no 
equity in the property and should be forced to give up the prop-
erty.243 Or the creditors will pressure the trustee to agree to sell 
their property quickly rather than attempt to use it in a reor-
ganization.244 In principle, the trustee or the court will do so only 
when the debtor has no equity in the property and the property 
is meaningless to a reorganization. But the pressure from a se-
cured creditor will occasionally lead to mistakes, despite the 
trustee’s fiduciary duty. Property that could return value for un-
secured creditors would be abandoned without generating that 
extra value. That is a problem. This is especially true because 
the value of the property is often unknown at first and whether 
the property could be used in a reorganization is uncertain, 
which increases the likelihood of error. 
Despite these potential drawbacks, the solution proposed in 
this Comment is the most efficient rule to govern secured-
creditor surcharges. The first reason is common to both flaws: 
the creditors will help minimize these problems by exercising 
their powers under the Code. Both drawbacks involve trustee 
shortfalls. In the first drawback, the trustee prioritizes her fee 
and does not pursue avoidance actions once her fee is secure, 
while in the second she undervalues the property. A duty of loy-
alty exists to prevent trustees from falling prey to such decisions—
the trustee must put the creditors’ interests first.245 In the event 
that the problems manifest, the unsecured creditors can bring 
 
 243 See 11 USC § 362(d)(2). 
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suit against the trustee. These actions may succeed often 
enough to ensure the trustee’s loyalty and concern.246 Further, 
the unsecured creditors can contest the decisions of the trustee 
or the debtor in possession.247 To do so, unsecured creditors often 
form committees to pursue avoidance actions that the trustee 
does not want to seek.248 Thus, when the trustee moves to aban-
don property, or a secured creditor moves the court to lift the au-
tomatic stay, the unsecured creditors can present the court with 
reasons why such a move would harm a potential reorganiza-
tion.249 While it is preferable that a trustee not misstep in the 
first instance, the creditors can always act to limit the damage. 
In addition, there are counterbalancing reasons for secured 
creditors to be less concerned with surcharges if courts focus on 
the collateral-expense connection. This crosscutting effect reduc-
es the fear that the trustee will abandon valuable property. 
Though this approach allows a surcharge any time that an ex-
pense is spent directly on the encumbered property, the propri-
ety of a surcharge is easy to prove. This Comment’s approach 
also clarifies that general expenses, such as attorney’s fees, 
should almost never be surcharged. In fact, in most cases in 
which trustees seek to surcharge secured creditors, they pursue 
general expenses. Though most are unsuccessful, the trustees 
evidently believe that there is at least some chance that the sur-
charge will be permitted. Perhaps if the surcharge action’s im-
permissibility were laid bare, secured creditors would be less 
concerned about surcharges, making them less likely to push for 
inefficient abandonment or waiver agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
In every bankruptcy, the trustee considers whether an ex-
pense can be surcharged, and the secured creditor fears the sur-
charge motion. Oftentimes, the secured creditor, motivated by 
this fear, provides cash to the debtor in exchange for an agree-
ment to waive potential surcharge claims. The entire bankruptcy 
pauses, unable to proceed until these high-stakes negotiations 
culminate in an agreement. These negotiations—and by 
 
 246 See Carter v Rodgers, 220 F3d 1249, 1253–54 (11th Cir 2000). 
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implication, the viability of the bankruptcy—depend heavily on 
the state of the law on the validity of surcharges. This is espe-
cially true because secured creditors typically do not appeal when 
they are surcharged. Given the option to regain some immediate 
value in lieu of a prolonged fight in court, the creditor may cut 
its losses and call it a day. 
Consequently, clear criteria for surcharges are essential. 
Bankruptcy judges should provide such clarity by relying on the 
connection between the expense and the collateral, rather than 
focusing on creditor consent or trustee intent. The split at the 
heart of this Comment—whether a trustee or a debtor in posses-
sion can surcharge when she did not intend to benefit the se-
cured creditor at the time she incurred the expense—turns on 
this difference. Focusing on the collateral-expense connection is 
the better reading of § 506(c). Despite Trim-X ’s assurances, a 
collateral-expense-connection approach is also the best reading 
of the pre-Code case law. Reliance on a collateral-expense-
connection approach is straightforward for courts to apply—far 
easier than discerning trustee intent or implied creditor consent. 
It also prevents the unjust enrichment of secured creditors. 
There might be some unexpected consequences—as with any de-
cision in bankruptcy—because every new rule creates new in-
centives and new issues. But this Comment’s solution overcomes 
those shortfalls and provides the uniformity and predictability 
essential to every stakeholder in a bankruptcy. 
